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Introduction  
Despite our ever-increasing interest in Nazi perpetrators, we still lack a precise 
definition of the term. Indeed, although much literature examines various 
persons and groups as perpetrators, few scholars have focused on what it is that 
makes them perpetrators. Instead, it is merely accepted that the subjects of 
perpetrator research – Täterforschung in German – are such, as scholars look to 
explain how and why they participate in acts of mass violence (Paul 2002 ). So 
in order to answer the question – whether state bureaucrats can be accurately 
described as perpetrators – we first need look at the dominant images that 
emerge in perpetrator research to see if they conform to what is there.  
By and large, historians have taken either a broad or narrow view of 
perpetration (Longerich 2009). Saul Friedlander and Raul Hilberg, for example, 
– the latter being among the first to use the term in a historical context – have 
both advocated a broader understanding of the term, viewing as perpetrators 
anyone involved in the persecution and murder of the Jews (Friedlander 2009; 
Hilberg 2006). In one of its earliest manifestations, therefore, the term 
‘perpetrator’ was Holocaust-specific. Defining perpetration solely in terms of 
the Nazis’ ‘Final Solution’ to the Jewish Question, however, can be problematic 
for a number of reasons. For one, it is well known that the Jews were just one of 
a number of victim groups persecuted and even murdered during the Third 
Reich. Although finding a solution to the Jewish ‘problem’ was undoubtedly 
among the most pressing concerns for the Nazi leadership, and was different in 
terms of the underlying motivations behind it (Evans 2014: 24), the eventual fate 
of others such as the Sinti and Roma or the ‘hereditarily ill,’ to take but two 
examples, was largely the same (Bastian 2001; Klee 2009).  
Another problem with Holocaust-specific definitions of perpetration is that 
they can also give rise to questions concerning the precise timeframe in which 
perpetration occurs. For in describing as perpetrators “all people who played a 
specific role in the formulation or implementation of anti-Jewish measures” 
(Hilberg 2006: ix), be it during or before the Second World War, one is forced 
to ask, at what point does perpetration begin? Or, to put it differently, when does 
a perpetrator become a perpetrator? This point becomes particularly acute 
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when considering that many of the regime’s early discriminatory measures, aimed at 
Jews and other minorities, had been drafted long before 1933. Consider Christopher 
Browning’s point concerning the Nazi regime’s first significant piece of racial 
legislation, the Law for the Restoration of a Professional Civil Service (RGBl 1933: 
377), as an example. “Even before Hitler’s assumption of power,” he argues, 
“schemes were being hatched in the Interior Ministry to purge the Civil Service, end 
the naturalization of Ostjuden (Eastern European Jews), and prohibit the changing of 
names to disguise Jewish identity” (Browning 1983: 145). In other words, the basic 
outline of this law was drafted during the Weimar Republic and merely implemented 
after Hitler became chancellor. However, if we accept that mass violence was in fact 
an outgrowth of these policies, and would hardly have been possible without them, 
then it might be argued that perpetration actually predated the Third Reich. One of 
the biggest problems with broader definitions of perpetration, therefore, is one of 
periodization.  
Narrower definitions of Nazi perpetrators, on the other hand, have a far more 
clearly defined timeframe. Indeed, since its emergence as a field of study in its own 
right, Täterforschung has focused almost exclusively on the SS and police battalions 
that participated, either directly or indirectly, in the atrocities commit-ted during the 
Second World War ( Mallmann and Paul 2014). Thus, we are no lon-ger talking 
about participation in the Holocaust per se, but rather mass violence in all its forms. 
Yet, even here the term ‘perpetrator’ is nowhere expressly defined. Instead, given 
their proximity to the killing, and the fact that they represent the regime that is 
driving the violence, it is merely assumed that they are perpetrators, as historians 
look to explore the apparatus and membership of these organiza-tions, the 
relationship between center (Berlin) and periphery (the occupied ter-ritories), as well 
as the complex and varying motivations of the actors involved (Longerich 2010: 2–
4). Just like broader understandings of the term, however, atrocity-centric 
understandings of perpetration can be problematic. For one, they fail to recognize 
that violence was just one form of persecution in Nazi Germany; a manifestation, in 
fact, of the broader structural conditions that facilitated and encouraged persecution 
in all its forms, and without which the atrocities would never have materialized. 
Secondly, the overwhelming focus, particularly in Ger-man language research, on 
the ‘policing’ organizations criminalized after the war underlines the extent to which 
legal terminology and scholarly research have almost become intertwined. Indeed, in 
his own survey of perpetrator research Stefan Kühl has shown how “there appears to 
be a broad consensus in scholarship that everyone who took part in the Holocaust – 
regardless of whether they were convicted by a court – are best described by using 
criminal categories” (Kühl 2014: 257–8).  
The fact remains, however, that there were some SS and police functionaries who 
were not involved in planning or implementing Nazi atrocities, and many non-
members – including some civil servants – who actually were. Finally, by focusing 
solely on wartime atrocities, we risk losing sight of the complex division of labor 
that characterized even the Nazi murder apparatus. The actions of perpe-trators on 
the ground were many, and not all of them led directly to the gas cham-bers. The 
recently convicted SS-Unterscharführer and Auschwitz bookkeeper, 
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Oskar Gröning, is a case in point. In July 2015, a Lüneburg court found Gröning 
guilty of being an accessory to the murder of 300,000 Hungarian Jews and sen-
tenced him to four years in prison. According to the findings of the court, his role 
consisted primarily of counting the money of the deportees and sending it on to 
SS headquarters in Berlin. Therefore, although Gröning was an important cog in 
the machinery of destruction, he did not, as far as we know, physically murder 
anybody. Instead, his and others’ roles within the system were in fact a by-
product of the decision to kill millions of people.  
Thus, both broad and narrow definitions of Nazi perpetrators exhibit certain 
limitations. Whereas the former provides for an almost limitless application of 
the term, the latter’s emphasis on atrocity can lose sight of the fact that Babi Yar 
and Auschwitz were but manifestations of a system that promoted and 
legitimized persecution in many forms. Many of these problems stem from our 
inability to provide a single, overarching definition of the term. And for good 
reason; there is no single definition of perpetration. Perpetration, rather, varies 
according to context and, as the scope of this present volume shows, cannot be 
limited to one time, place or group. That said, it is still incumbent on historians 
who engage in perpetrator research to provide a definition of perpetration that 
reflect the his-torical circumstances in which it occurs. For before we can 
determine who the perpetrators are, we first need to define what perpetration is. 
And to achieve this, historians should focus on the different acts that make 
perpetrators what they are (Mallmann and Paul 2014: 23).  
During the Third Reich at least, it is abundantly clear that perpetration 
involved more than the mere act of killing, just as being a victim was about 
more than being killed. “Perpetration”, rather, according to Mary Fulbrook, 
“was also possi-ble through administration, ‘Germanization’, stigmatization, 
camps, ghettos etc” (Fulbrook 2012). Although perpetrators in the narrow sense 
were also engaged in acts such as these, they usually belonged to the SS and 
police units active in the occupied eastern territories, and it is their roles as 
killers, along with their motivations for killing, that interests historians the most 
( Wildt 2003 ). But if we accept that these acts also constitute perpetration, then 
it becomes clear that it was not limited to the SS and police battalions in the 
East, and was just as vis-ible in Germany prior to and during the Second World 
War. In fact, all but one of the acts perpetrated in the East – that of mass murder 
– were replicated by senior civil servants over the course of the Third Reich. 
After all, with its innumera-ble laws and decrees, it was the bureaucracy who 
brought about the “civic and social death” of the German Jews, “thus delivering 
them into the hands of the SS” (Browning 1983: 146). Thus considered, it can be 
reasonably assumed that much civil service behavior back in Berlin – which 
basically involved legislating for the identification, disenfranchisement and 
sometimes even death of the regime’s victims – was, indeed, tantamount to 
perpetration, and that broader definitions of Nazi perpetrators, despite their 
obvious flaws, are just as valid as those that appear in Täterforschung.  
In what follows, then, I will further elucidate the nature of civil service perpe-
tration by showing how the actions of senior civil servants facilitated persecution 
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and, in some cases, even murder in Nazi Germany. Rather than treating the 
bureaucracy as a whole, however, I will examine four different, high-ranking 
civil servants – Friedrich-Wilhelm Kritzinger, Franz Schlegelberger, Johannes 
Krohn and Wilhelm Stuckart. For, as Richard Overy has argued, each case needs 
to be treated on its own merits, because even within each historical situation 
there are often different forms of perpetration (Overy 2009 ). Taking Overy’s 
point to its logical conclusion, however, the concluding section then examines 
other aspects of civil servants’ behavior, showing that other acts in other 
situations were not, in fact, tantamount to perpetration. Indeed, sometimes civil 
servants actively worked against the stated aims of the regime. Focusing on the 
Janus-faced nature of their conduct, therefore, it will be shown that although 
perpetration was indeed a widespread phenomenon in the German bureaucracy 
under Nazism, the singular term ‘perpetrator’ can sometimes fail to capture the 
complexity of civil servants’ behavior. Thus, perpetration in Nazi Germany will 
be examined as a context-specific phenomenon, meaning that it was possible to 
be a perpetrator in one context, and not in another. 
 
Civil servants being perpetrators 
 
Like all modern bureaucracies, the German administration under Nazism was 
characterized by a highly complex division of labor. Hence, it is unsurprising that 
some government departments were more directly concerned with persecution than 
others. That said, because persecution was a matter of administration, and therefore a 
concern for the civil service, practically everyone who chose to serve the state in 
Nazi Germany helped to decide the fate of its victims. The Justice Ministry’s Franz 
Schlegelberger is a case in point. One of the few secretaries of state to serve both the 
Weimar and National Socialist governments, Schlegel-berger oversaw the slow but 
deadly evolution of legal policy in Germany and the annexed eastern territories. Like 
many bureaucrats of his rank, Schlegelberger worked tirelessly to align the aims of 
the new leadership and the interests of the civil service early on. So it should come 
as no surprise that he, too, helped give legal expression to many of the regime’s 
primary ideological objectives. Dur-ing the first few months of Hitler’s rule, in fact, 
he helped resuscitate the Law for the Restoration of a Professional Civil Service 
(BBG) – the first drafts of which had been prepared during the Weimar period – , 
which provided the legal basis for purging racially and politically undesirable 
officials from state employ-ment ( Adam 2003: 47–8). Perhaps the first significant 
piece of racial legislation introduced by the regime, the BBG also provided the 
framework for the further removal of Jews and other ‘non Germans’ (Majer 2003) 
from other spheres of public life, and by 1934, Schlegelberger issued further 
directives to the courts banning the appointment of Jewish lawyers in cases where 
legal aid was required. Of course, such efforts need to be seen as part of the regime’s 
overall attempt to ‘cleanse’ German society of Jewish influence. And it is widely 
accepted that Schlegelberger and the Justice Ministry were responding, at least in 
part, to pres-sure from Nazi party radicals, who were already pushing policy in this 
direction 
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(Nathans 1990: 45–6). Whether he was the driving force or not, however, it has 
long been accepted that motivations play no part in determining who the perpe-
trators are (Browning 1998). All that mattered was compliance, which Schlegel-
berger duly provided. This willingness to cooperate was also on display when it 
came to removing Jews from the legal profession outright. Indeed, 
Schlegelberger was one of the key figures behind the implementation of the Fifth 
Decree to the Reich Citizenship Law, which again revoked the right of Jews to 
practice law in Germany and the incorporated Austrian territories (RGBl 1938: 
1146). Act-ing on behalf of lawyers who were ‘German,’ he first suggested the 
measure in mid-1938, whereupon the law was enacted the following September 
(BArch B R 43-II/1535). Schlegelberger also personally dictated some of the 
law’s more detailed provisions, particularly those relating to the legal 
representation of Jews themselves. Where this was required, he insisted, they 
should be represented by other Jews conditionally licensed by the judicial 
administration. Rather than call-ing them lawyers, however, he suggested they 
be referred to as ‘legal advisors’ (BArch B R 3001/20253).  
As we can see, Schlegelberger played an active role in the identification and 
progressive disenfranchisement of minorities before 1939, many of whom would 
later be killed by the National Socialist regime. But it was during the war that he 
made his most radical contribution to the regime’s persecutory agenda. With the 
invasion of Poland, persecution came to include state-sponsored occupation, 
ethnic cleansing, forced labor and mass murder. All these were matters of 
administration and therefore required the complicity of senior bureaucrats like 
Schlegelberger. With areas such as the Sudetenland and Western Poland now 
incorporated into ‘Greater Germany,’ German courts were instilled in areas 
where there lived significant numbers of Czechs, Poles and, of course, Jews. His 
role in the persecution of the Jews before the war proved his readiness to 
execute the regime’s will. During the war, however, he looked to fend off SS 
attacks on his administrative competence by calling for even harsher treatment 
of ‘non-Germans.’ In 1941, for example, he complained “that the administration 
of Justice showed an incomprehensibly considerate attitude towards the Polish 
people, who are irreconcilably hostile to us.” Presenting them as a danger to 
public safety, he expressed the hope that from now on “the heaviest punishments 
[would] be inflicted on Polish criminals” (Majer 2003: 336). Similarly, 
Schlegelberger ordered the courts to administer “exemplary punishments to 
Jews in 1942.” Referring specifically to the lenient treatment of a Jew who sold 
a bottle of brandy, and Jews who used the Hitler salute in Moscow, he ordered 
that in future such cases should be treated as treason (Majer 2003: 341). At the 
time, convicted acts of treason carried the death penalty.  
Such calls for the harsher treatment of Poles and Jews found their ultimate 
expression in the Decree Concerning Criminal Justice in the Incorporated East-ern 
Territories (RGBl 1941: 759). According to the decree, ‘non-Germans’ were to be 
subject to special law in the incorporated territories. Going forward, Jews and Poles 
were to be sentenced to death if they, for example, committed acts of violence 
against Germans or even uttered anti-German remarks. To be sure, much 
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of the law’s content reflected the wishes of Hitler, Himmler and Martin 
Bormann, with Schlegelberger even managing to thwart the latter’s attempts to 
introduce corporal punishment (Neliba 2005: 20). However, it was the Justice 
Secretary who completed the final draft, adding the caveat that neither Poles nor 
Jews were entitled to legal representation, and it was he who signed an 
appendage the fol-lowing month ordering the new law to be applied even in 
cases heard before it was introduced (von Alten 2009: 68–9).  
These are just some of Schlegelberger’s acts that were tantamount to perpetra-
tion. Like him, the Reich Chancellery’s Friedrich-Wilhelm Kritzinger was another 
high-ranking bureaucrat who perpetrated through administration; in other words, by 
helping to formulate and implement a range of discriminatory policies. Unlike 
Schlegelberger, however, whose administrative mandate was largely limited to 
matters of jurisprudence, practically all laws enacted during the Third Reich landed 
on Kritzinger’s desk because of the Chancellery’s role as a coordinating office 
between senior government agencies and as their main point of contact with Hitler 
(Rebentisch 1989: 69–71). Thus, whereas other ministries only became involved in 
the political process when it concerned them, the Chancellery coordi-nated 
discussions and perfected legislative drafts on issues ranging from the eutha-nasia 
program to the persecution of the Jews (Mommsen 1966a: 272). Kritzinger’s own 
department within the Chancellery was directly responsible for processing and 
transferring the legislative initiatives of and between the Interior and Justice 
ministries; the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces; the Finance, Labor and 
Economics ministries; as well as the German railway and postal services. Follow-ing 
his appointment in 1938, therefore, he communicated with the Reich’s most 
important agencies about a wide range of discriminatory policies. For example, 
documents concerning the persecution of the clergy and the murder of ‘hereditar-ily 
ill’ – the so-called euthanasia program – carry his signature. By and large, these were 
merely passed on to the relevant departments (Mommsen 1966a: 378–9).  
As with most civil servants, however, Kritzinger played a far more active role in 
the promulgation of anti-Jewish legislation. Like most administrative agencies in the 
Third Reich, the Chancellery had an office that dealt exclusively with Jew-ish 
affairs. Aptly named “Jews and Half-Jew Matters,” Kritzinger was its chief from 
1940 (Mommsen 1966a: 370). This helps explain why he was invited to the now 
infamous Wannsee conference in 1942, a meeting convened by the leader of the 
Reich Security Main Office (RSHA), Reinhard Heydrich, to coordinate a ‘Final 
Solution’ to the Jewish Question. Beyond the fact that he was present, the only 
surviving evidence of the meeting reveals nothing of Kritzinger’s reaction to what 
was discussed (PAAA R 100857). Nevertheless, his mere presence sug-gests that 
Heydrich expected the Chancellery’s full cooperation in the endeavor. In the months 
preceding the conference, moreover, Kritzinger was also involved in discussions 
concerning contentious position of half and quarter Jews, Jews in mixed marriages, 
as well as those pertaining to the Eleventh Decree to the Reich Citizenship Law 
(RGBl 1941: 1146). With a view to legalizing the deportations that were already 
taking place, an Interior Ministry draft law stipulated that all Jews in Germany be 
made stateless and their property transferred to the Reich, 
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a move which Kritzinger agreed with in principle. However, in light of the mas-sive 
legal difficulties such a move would entail, and because there would soon be no 
Jews left in Germany, he argued that Jews should only me made stateless once they 
crossed the German border, more often than not in trains bound for the East. With 
the help of his direct superior, Hans-Heinrich Lammers, Kritzinger was able to 
ensure that the final draft of the law reflected his wishes. Follow-ing Hitler’s 
approval, it was passed in November 1941. And although it failed to create a semi-
legal basis for the deportations themselves, it did essentially sanc-tion the 
consequences of deportation, such as the loss of property and rights that were 
attached to citizenship (Mommsen 1966a: 388). Like the aforementioned  
SS Bookkeeper and Perpetrator, Oskar Gröning, therefore, Kritzinger was not 
complicit it mass murder per se but rather in acts that came about as a result of 
the regime’s genocidal practices.  
Kritzinger’s stint in the Reich Chancellery spanned the years 1938 to 1945, a 
period that witnessed the deadly evolution of Nazi racial policy. The Labor Min-
istry’s Johannes Krohn, conversely, was forced out of office in 1939 following a 
years-long turf war with the leader of the German Labor Front, Robert Ley, who set 
his organization up as a kind of shadow Labor Ministry that progressively usurped 
the administrative mandate of the actual Labor Ministry (BAK N 1430 and Rüdiger 
Hachtmann 2011). Having been relieved of his duties, therefore, Krohn was not in a 
position to assist the regime in its wartime excesses in a way similar to Schlegel-
berger and Kritzinger, at least not in his capacity as Labor Secretary. Indeed, it fell to 
his successor, Friedrich Syrup, to help oversee the regime’s forced labor program 
during the war (NMT XIV: 827–32); a slice of luck that arguably helped save his 
reputation after 1945 (Rohrbeck 1954). This does not mean, however, that Krohn did 
not commit acts of perpetration. As we saw earlier, perpetration was also pos-sible 
through administration, even before the war. And during his time in the Labor 
Ministry, he too played his part in identifying and disenfranchising the regime’s 
victims. Although the Labor Ministry’s involvement in the legislative process was 
limited to areas that concerned it, whilst in office Krohn and his Minister, Franz 
Seldte, were largely able to defend its position as the Reich’s foremost authority on 
social, labor and health policies (Süß 2003: 51). Furthermore, considering Seldte’s 
disinterest in social matters, along with Krohn’s expertise in this area (Krohn 1926, 
1938), it is unsurprising that the Labor Secretary would help formulate a raft of 
discriminatory social legislation. The Law Concerning Tenancy Arrangements for 
Jews (RGBl 1939: 864), for example, signed by Krohn in April 1939, provided for 
the eviction of Jews from their homes if their landlord was German, and insisted that 
the resultant homeless families be accepted by other Jews still in possession of their 
apartments. “Eventually, these Judenhäuser [Jewish Houses] were filled from floor 
to ceiling” (Hilberg 2003: 170).  
To be sure, we know that neither Krohn nor the Labor Ministry was the origi-
nal source of this initiative. It was in fact a compromise measure between Her-
mann Göring and Heydrich (Heim 2009: 242). However, the documents sent the 
Chancellery for final approval in March 1939, stated that all participants, Krohn 
included, agreed with the draft proposal to remove the Jews from German 
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“residential space” (BArch B R 43-II/1171a). Similarly, Krohn was also involved in 
the development of discriminatory healthcare policies in the Third Reich. Because 
there was no actual Health Ministry in Nazi Germany, the administra-tion of 
healthcare was shared among different departments. The Labor Ministry, therefore, 
was able to exert influence in this area because statutory health provi-sion was a 
matter of social insurance (Süß 2003: 51). Winfried Süß maintains that the Labor 
Ministry’s approach to healthcare policy was “conservative in a nar-row sense, and 
merely concerned with the maintenance of the status quo” (ibid.). However, given 
the speed with which things developed in the Third Reich, it could be argued that 
even the status quo was constantly in flux. In this area, too, Seldte was a 
disinterested observer, and he ceded responsibility to Krohn and his successors. This 
explains why it was Krohn and not his minister, who signed some of the Third 
Reich’s most discriminatory health legislation. For example, the Third Decree 
Concerning the Implementation of the Law for the Prevention of Genetically 
Diseased Offspring, signed by Krohn in February 1935, ensured that state health 
insurance funds would cover the costs of sterilizing those judged to be incurably ill, 
whereas a Decree Concerning the Participation of Jews in State Health Insurance 
Funds, signed by Krohn in October 1938, severely inhibited Jews’ ability to practice 
medicine by refusing Jewish doctors the right to claim costs from state health 
insurance funds (RGBl 1938: 367).  
These are just some of the discriminatory laws and decrees Krohn helped 
formulate during his time in the Labor Ministry. As with Schlegelberger and 
Kritzinger, there is little in the archives to suggest he was the driving force 
behind these policies. Like them, in fact, there is much to suggest that he too 
was responding to the radical demands of the new regime, at least in part. As 
with perpetrators in other contexts, however, personal motivations have no 
bearing on their status as perpetrators. People were persecuted and even killed 
despite the varying motivations of the actors involved. What mattered most was 
compliance with the general program, which Krohn duly provided.  
Another person who acted in this manner was Wilhelm Stuckart. The only 
member of the group without a departmental portfolio before Hitler took power, 
Stuckart entered the Education Ministry – first as department head, then as State 
Secretary – in June 1933, not because of his expertise in this field but because of 
his long-standing ties to the Nazi Party (BArch SSO 167B). Appointed two 
months after the enactment of the BBG, one of his first tasks as leader of the 
ministry’s education department was to help purge schools and universities of 
their politically and racially undesirable teachers and professors, whereupon “by 
March 1934, German universities had lost numerous world-renowned scholars 
thanks to the work of Stuckart and his colleagues” (Jasch 2012: 79). Despite his 
obvious willingness to assist the regime in pursuit of its ideological goals, how-
ever, he was soon removed from office by his minister, Bernhard Rust, for alleg-
edly challenging the latter’s authority, and was forced to spend a short period on 
the margins of power before his eventual transfer to the Interior Ministry in 
1935. In light of his previous fall from grace, Stuckart obviously had something 
to prove in his new post, not only to the Interior Minister – the long-time Nazi 
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Wilhelm Frick – but also to “Hitler himself, who intervened to prevent Stuckart 
from being consigned to provincial oblivion” (Caplan 1980: 44). And whereas 
the enactment of the BBG allowed Stuckart to prove his worth to the Nazi 
educa-tion administration, the passing of the Nuremburg Laws would provide 
him with ample opportunity to do so in the Interior Ministry. Indeed, as head of 
the Depart-ment for Constitutional and Legislative Matters (BArch R 601/1817), 
in autumn 1935 Stuckart was at the forefront of the regime’s efforts to rob Jews 
of their full citizenship, make it illegal for Jews to have sex with non-Jews, and 
everything else that the Nuremburg Laws entailed (Kershaw 2010 : 345). He 
even wrote the official commentary to the laws with Hans Globke the following 
year (Stuckart and Globke 1936).  
Having remained in office after 1939, moreover, Stuckart was also involved in a 
variety of measures that either led to, or were the result of, the regime’s murder-ous 
excesses during the war. For example, it was he who signed a secret decree in 1939 
calling for the forced registration of ‘deformed’ babies and small children in 
preparation for the euphemistically labeled child ‘euthanasia’ program, which in fact 
amounted to the systematic mass murder of apparently handicapped children (Jasch 
2012: 287). Like his colleagues, moreover, he too was involved in discus-sions 
concerning the Final Solution to the Jewish Question. As we have just seen, Stuckart 
had helped pave the way for the mass murder of the Jews before the war by 
promulgating laws that both identified and disenfranchised the proposed victim 
group, “thus delivering them into the hands of the SS” (Browning 1983: 146). But 
even after the regime’s conception of the Final Solution shifted from a ‘territorial 
solution’ to one based on murder, the complicity of civil servants was still required, 
be it in providing a ‘legal’ safeguard for the deportations themselves or in defining 
who was to be murdered (Jasch 2012: 290). So it should come as no surprise that 
Stuckart, too, was involved in debates concerning the position of quarter and half 
Jews – the so-called Mischlinge – , as well those relating to Jews in mixed marriages 
(Mischehen); issues that dominated the aforementioned Wannsee Conference. 
Although it is still being debated whether the wholesale destruction of all Jews was 
discussed at the conference, the fact that it was even called suggests that their 
deportation to the East had already been decided upon. Who ‘they’ were, however, 
was not. Just as in Germany before the war, despite the best efforts of the regime it 
was not always clear who the Jews were, and who, consequently, was to be 
subjected to discriminatory measures; a particularly vex-ing question in light of the 
ongoing deportations. Like Kritzinger, who was invited to represent the Reich 
Chancellery, Stuckart was present as the Interior Ministry’s representative. But 
whereas little is known about the former’s reaction to what was being discussed, the 
only surviving document from the meeting suggests that the latter was one of its 
most vocal participants. Like most of his colleagues at the meeting, it appears that 
Stuckart had nothing against the deportations in principal; a position supported by 
his previous contributions to the regime’s discriminatory agenda. In relation to the 
Mischlinge and Mischehen living in Germany, however, he argued against their 
deportation for largely the same reasons that Kritzinger rejected Stuckart’s proposal 
to make them stateless; the endless administrative 
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difficulties. That said, so as to not hinder the regime’s efforts to ‘solve’ the 
Jewish problem, Stuckart suggested – ultimately in vain – that those Jews who 
were not deported should be forcibly sterilized (PAAA R 100857).  
These are just some of the ways political civil servants in the Third Reich 
perpetrated through administration. Such acts may not have led directly to, and were 
always far removed from, mass violence. But they were part of the broad web of 
persecution that either led to, or emerged from Nazi atrocities. Indeed, through their 
innumerable laws and decrees it was men like Schlegelberger, Kritzinger, Krohn and 
Stuckart who first helped define the objects of Nazi persecution – the victims – 
before implementing a program of political, social and economic disenfranchisement 
that threatened the already fragile existence of various minority groups in Hitler’s 
Germany. Once that country was at war, moreover, at a time when persecution came 
to include occupation, ethnic cleansing, forced labor and mass murder, those who 
remained in office invariably helped facilitate these acts because they, too, were 
matters of administration that required the legal know-how and technical expertise 
these men possessed. They may not have been the driving forces behind these 
policies. In some instances, in fact, civil servants even spoke out against the regime’s 
excesses. As was mentioned earlier, however, motivations carry little weight in 
determining who the perpetrators were. The only thing required was compliance, 
which each of the men surveyed here duly provided. Thus, in the sense that they 
legislated for the identification, disenfranchisement and, indirectly, sometimes even 
murder – acts which, in and of themselves, comply with Fulbrook’s broader 
definition of perpetration through administration – , it is fair to conclude that 
Schlegelberger, Kritzinger, Krohn and Stuckart were perpetrators. 
 
But if we accept the points made earlier, that perpetration was both context-
specific and defined by the acts themselves, how then do we define other acts in 
other contexts? And how does an analysis of the broad spectrum of civil service 
behavior affect our understanding of these men as perpetrators? In the following 
section, then, I will explore the margins of the term perpetrator by examining some 
civil servants’ acts that were not, in fact, tantamount to perpetration. Indeed, as will 
be shown below, Schlegelberger, Kritzinger, Krohn and Stuckart occasionally 
worked against the stated aims of the regime in ways that appear to contradict their 
singular definition as perpetrators. Taken together with the previous section, 
therefore, it will be shown that perpetration was a context-specific phenomenon, 
meaning that it was possible to be a perpetrator in one context and not in another. 
 
Civil servants not being perpetrators 
 
Schlegelberger and Kritzinger, for example, were part of a group of civil ser-vants 
that provided assistance to the former Minister of Justice from the Weimar period, 
Curt Joël, under whom both men had served before Hitler took power. Defined as a 
full Jew according to the Nuremburg Laws of 1935 – drafts of which Schlegelberger 
and Kritzinger, who both worked in the Justice Ministry at the time, would have 
helped shape – Joël should have been subjected to the full gamut 
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of restrictions these laws embodied. Thanks to the intervention of his former 
col-leagues, however, he managed to evade some of the harsher measures that 
came about as a result of his loss of citizenship. Indeed, thanks in no small part 
to Kritz-inger’s personal intervention, Joël’s successor as Justice Minister, Franz 
Gürtner, promised to stick up for Joël should his existence be threatened by 
these mea-sures. Such assistance took shape in a number of different ways. In 
the aftermath of the Night of the Broken Glass, for example, he was exempted 
from a special tax ordering Jews to pay for the damages, mostly to their own 
property, inflicted by Nazi thugs during the pogrom. And whereas other Justice 
Ministry officials inter-vened to ensure that Joël received the same food rations 
as a full German citizen (Reichsbürger), it was Schlegelberger who obtained 
him German’s clothing card, which exempted him from the restrictions placed 
on Jews obtaining clothes dur-ing the war (Godau-Schüttke 1981: 221–7). When 
Joël became sick, moreover, Kritzinger intervened personally to ensure that his 
former boss was sent to one of Berlin’s best hospitals instead of the vastly 
under-provided-for hospitals that had been set up specifically to treat Jews. And 
when he or his family members were threatened with deportation, Kritzinger 
was among those who helped ensure this never happened (FUA E7/2276).  
As with most civil servants who stood trial after the war, such acts were presented 
to the courts as evidence of the defendants’ ‘resistance’ to the Nazi regime. Unlike 
most, however, Schlegelberger’s and Kritzinger’s claims were actually backed up by 
the Joël family. The same was also true of Schlegelberger’s efforts to save former 
colleagues from the judiciary from losing their jobs and, later on, from being 
deported. According to his biographer Eli Nathans, in fact, Schlegelberger worked to 
delay the deportation of his former colleague and childhood friend – a Jewish 
Supreme Court judge named Alexander Cohn – “and once this was no longer 
possible, he ensured that Cohn and his wife were sent to Theresienstadt, the least 
murderous of all the Nazi concentration camps.” Similarly, he is known to have 
helped former colleagues classified as Mischlinge by the regime, with one district 
court judge confirming that Schlegelberger helped him transfer to a small Prussian 
town where it was easier to hide his identity, whilst the wife of another, Johannes 
Koffka, told the courts that Schlegelberger helped Koffka remain in office until 1942 
(Nathans 1990: 42–4). The irony behind these acts is that Schlegelberger, as we saw 
earlier, was at the forefront of efforts to remove Jews from the German legal 
profession in their entirety. Therefore, isolated acts such as these should in no way 
obscure the ways these men facilitated persecution and even murder during the Third 
Reich. In themselves, however, they do highlight the limits of the term perpetrator as 
a tool of historical analysis, underlining the extent to which it can sometimes fail to 
capture the complexity of human behavior. For although people became perpetrators 
in one situation, this was not always the case in others. 
 
Stuckart, similarly, was part of a group of intellectuals who became quite criti-cal 
of Nazi occupation policies during World War Two; policies which, originally, 
Stuckart helped to formulate. Set up in 1939 to discuss the urgent the questions sur-
rounding the domination, organization and administration of German-dominated 
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Europe, the group looked to posit an alternative model of ‘rational’ domination 
based on radical ethnic principles (Herbert 1996: 278–9). Arguing in favor of a 
European community of nations separated strictly along racial lines – and led, of 
course, by the continent’s dominant race; the Germans – , the group wrote a num-ber 
of articles lamenting the regime’s excessive and indiscriminate use of force. In stark 
contrast to the denationalizing policies being pursued by Hitler and others, Stuckart 
even argued that “German hegemony should not mean denationalization and 
repression. National Socialism, rather, by virtue of its own explicit national-ism, 
respected national differences and would offer freedom from domination . . .  
with each ‘worthy’ group being allowed to develop independently and enjoy its 
own living space” (cited in Mazower 2008: 246–7).  
Even within this critique, it should be noted that Stuckart’s blatant racism is 
clearly on display. Indeed, the group’s blueprint for the racial reordering of Europe 
was to follow a strict racial hierarchy. Whereas some groups were to be treated in a 
conciliatory manner, toughness was required with the most primitive, inferior or 
racially poisonous peoples. The basic point, however, made in another article, was 
that “the Germans had become indiscriminately and excessively violent; one could 
not expect to expel or annihilate all other people on the continent since that defeated 
the purpose of establishing German hegemony in the first place” (Mazower 2008: 
232–47). So although their message was abstruse and couched in a virulent racism, 
the group nevertheless offered, “elliptically but unmistakably, a new direction for 
German rule” (Mazower 2008: 232–47). Why did Stuckart – a man who had and 
would continue to do so much to assist the regime in the realm of racial policy – 
speak out against the murderous course taken by the regime during the war? 
Although it cannot be proven, it is certainly possible that it offended his sense of 
moral decency on some level. Indeed, Kritzinger, who also assisted the regime in 
this area, is known to have been disgusted by the occupations policies practiced in 
Poland (Mommsen 1966a: 397). What is known, is that Stuckart was frustrated by 
the fact that his original blueprint for occupation was not being followed, and that 
his ministry – and therefore he himself – was dwindling in significance as a result of 
the proliferation of extra- or quasi-state institutions which were progressively 
eroding the Interior Ministry’s administrative mandate (Rebentisch 1991: 477). So 
his attempts to influence occupation policy in this direction need to be seen, at least 
in part, as a response to his own loss of power, as an attempt, indeed, to remain 
significant.  
The same might also be said of Krohn’s efforts to ensure that Jews who fought in 
World War One were not removed from the legal profession. In the eyes of the law, 
though not always in practice, this group was originally protected against some anti-
Semitic measures because of their previous sacrifices for Germany. By 1938, 
however, conservative elements within the regime – some of whom sup-ported the 
Jewish war veterans’ cause – were either on the defensive or in decline, whereas 
more radical elements within the regime were growing in confidence and stature. As 
always, this latter group favored the broadest possible definition of who the Jews 
were, and therefore wanted all of them – whether full, half or quar-ter, veteran or 
non-veteran – removed from the legal and other professions. As 
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Secretary of State in Germany’s foremost social policy ministry (the Labor Min-
istry), and therefore responsible for considering how these Jews should survive 
or be provided for in light of losing their livelihoods, Krohn’s office was asked 
to clarify its position on the matter in early summer 1938. In response, the 
Justice Ministry’s proposal to revoke the special position of Jewish war 
veterans, Krohn’s office issued an impassioned plea to respect those Jews who 
had sacrificed so much for German and allow them to continue serving at the 
bar. “I feel compelled to make these deliberations” it was argued, “so that the 
necessary special posi-tion of the wartime injured and war participants in the 
Third Reich, including the Jewish war veterans who are lawyers, does not go 
unnoticed in relation to important matters of state policy,” by which was meant 
the progressive attack on the economic position of the Jews. In conclusion, 
however, the letter stated that “even if they cannot be exempted from economic 
constraints or suppression, this should not lead to a devaluing of soldierly worth 
in the eyes of the public” (BArch B R 3001/20253). On some level, at least, 
there can be little doubt that Krohn identified with the proposed victims; he too 
had fought and was severely injured during the First World War. But, very much 
like Stuckart, there was also another, more strategic element to his protests. 
After 1933, it had become part of the Labor Ministry’s administrative mandate 
to treat the cases of injured Jewish war veterans who, despite their special status, 
were nevertheless subjected to the regime’s discriminatory measures, which 
essentially meant trying to ensure that the ‘non-Aryan’ war wounded received 
the same benefits, pensions and employ-ment protection as their ‘Aryan’ 
counterparts (Geheren 2016). Had Krohn simply conceded to the demands of the 
radicals – whose position would eventually win the day anyway – , it would 
have meant losing more administrative authority to the German Labor Front, 
which, as we saw earlier, had set itself up as a kind of shadow Labor Ministry. 
Thus, it is partly against the backdrop of the internecine power struggles that 
defined the Third Reich that Stuckart’s and Krohn’s protests need to be seen. 
 
Conclusions 
 
By focusing on the actions of Franz Schlegelberger, Friedrich-Wilhelm Kritz-inger, 
Wilhelm Stuckart and Johannes Krohn, the preceding analysis has shown that it was 
possible for a person to be a perpetrator in one situation and not in another. 
Perpetration in the Third Reich involved far more than the act of killing. It also 
included legislating for the persecution and sometimes even murder of the regime’s 
victims; a phenomenon Mary Fulbrook has referred to as “perpetration through 
administration” (Fullbrook 2012). Therefore, in the situations where they acted in 
ways that facilitated these ends, these men can be considered as perpetra-tors. At the 
same time, however, it has also been shown that not all civil service behavior was 
tantamount to perpetration. In some instances, in fact, civil ser-vants actually worked 
against the stated aims of the regime, either by helping, or attempting to help, 
individual or groups of Jews, or by trying to change the course of Nazi occupation 
policy during World War Two. 
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How, then, does this affect our understanding of these men as perpetrators? Most 
importantly, it shows that perpetration was a context-specific phenomenon. 
Although I have examined only the most extreme examples at opposite ends of the 
behavioral spectrum, so much of what people did in Nazi Germany had no bearing 
on the fate of the regime’s victims and therefore cannot be considered as typical 
perpetrator behavior. Because perpetration was situational, historians need to focus 
how people interact with these situations, not as perpetrators a priori but as complex 
individuals acting in complex historical circumstances; an approach that will also 
benefit the analysis of behavior that was not tantamount to perpetration. For if 
historians focus on individual actors solely as perpetrators, they will only end up 
examining those aspects of their behavior that makes them perpetrators, failing to 
comprehend that the complexity of human behavior defies overtly simplistic, and 
essentially legal definitions like perpetrator, bystander, sometimes even victim, as 
recent studies of rape during the Holocaust have controversially shown (Hedgepeth 
and Saidel 2010). During the course of this, or any historical period, the fine margins 
between these categories were often in flux, meaning that it was possible for a 
person to be many or all of these things over time. With regards to Schlegelberger, 
Kritzinger, Stuckart and Krohn, these men were both critical of the regime and yet 
actively complicit in its crimes; something we risk losing sight of when referring to 
them merely as perpetrators. 
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